ABSTRACT Recently, more and more users begin to outsource their job executions to service clouds, which brings benefits for both users and providers. Unfortunately, the fixed-price models which are commonly used by most clouds have several shortcomings, such as requesting users to specify and monitor their resources as well as being difficult to set prices. These shortcomings limit the usage of fixed-price models for service clouds and, thus, service providers with finite resource urgently need effective approaches to schedule and price user's jobs, with the goal of social welfare maximization. In response to the need of service providers, this paper designs new auction mechanisms for service clouds, with unique features of job-oriented users, pleasingly parallel jobs, and soft deadline constraints. However, several challenges should be addressed when designing mechanisms, such as the NP-hardness of finding the optimal job scheduling and possible misreports of selfish users for private information. To deal with these challenges, we first propose a new randomized scheduling mechanism for optimally scheduling and pricing pleasingly parallel jobs in service clouds. This mechanism is truthful in expectation, while achieving α-approximation to the social welfare. However, potential collusion among cloud users which may result in significant effects has been ignored by this mechanism. To handle the collusion problem, we further propose a collusion-resistant mechanism which achieves (t, P)-truthful while scheduling and pricing jobs. Both of these two mechanisms are computationally efficient and individually rational, and they can schedule jobs in a way without preemption. Finally, the theoretical analysis and extensive simulations based on synthetic data and real-world job traces validate the effectiveness of our mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to cost-saving, expertise and management concerns, more and more users begin to outsource their job executions to professional service providers, which promotes a new type of cloud offerings-service clouds. A service cloud operates a set of resources in the form of physical or virtual machine instances and provides professional services to end users. Taking a rendering service cloud 1 as an example, it supplies rendering job execution services which accept rendering jobs from users and execute computations to produce pictures or videos as service results. While outsourcing allows cloud users to run their jobs in a pay-per-use way, it also brings revenue opportunities to service clouds through economy of scale [1] . 1 Fox renderfarm, http://www.foxrenderfarm.com/ For service clouds, this paper targets the goal of maximizing the social welfare (i.e., the total utility of all individuals in the system, including the service cloud and all users). Traditionally, many clouds such as Amazon 2 and Google 3 sell their instances by fixed-price models, by which users pay per-unit resource (e.g., an instance) per-unit time (e.g., an hour). These models are simple and easy to implement, but they have two obvious shortcomings which limit their feasibility for service clouds. First, they trade resources other than services. Users in a fixed-price model need to specify the number of resources (e.g., instances) they need and monitor the execution of their jobs. Reversely, users in service clouds are generally job-oriented. It means when they purchase the job execution services, they only care about the completion of their jobs and ignore the concrete resource usage. Second, since prices are fixed and will not change according to the demand and supply, fixed-price models are economically inefficient. Both underpricing and overpricing will result in the damage of social welfare, especially when the resources are finite.
Job-oriented users in service clouds have valuations for the completion of their jobs and they usually have different valuations for different completion time, defining as a ''soft'' deadline constraint. The calculation of the social welfare is related to these valuations. When the resource demands of executing jobs exceed the capacity of the cloud, competitions occur between users. Thus to achieve optimal social welfare, service clouds need to execute jobs selectly according to the valuations of users. Fig. 1 shows the working scenario of a service cloud, which has multiple types of instances to provide services. While submitting service requests, users are required to report the valuations which indicate their willingness to pay to the service cloud. The requirement and valuation preferences of users on their job executions are divergent. After collecting the information, the service cloud executes the jobs on its instances selectively to produce service results and charges users corresponding payments. In the situation that clouds' resources are finite, how to schedule and charge the job execution requests efficiently becomes a significant problem. The above scheduling and pricing problem for arbitrary types of jobs in a service cloud is often a multifaceted puzzle, thus is sometimes intractable. In this work we focus on pleasingly (also called perfectly or embarrassingly) parallel jobs, which have flexible degree of parallelism and can be divided into an arbitrary but reasonable number of identical tasks to execute in parallel on different instances, while no extra effort is needed. In this situation different scheduling schemes for a job can result in different completion time. This type of jobs accounts for a large proportion in cloud market, such as 3D video rendering, BLAST search and data cleansing [2] .
From the perspective of service clouds, for optimally scheduling pleasingly parallel jobs and maximizing social welfare, the private information which is the valuations of users for their jobs is needed. Since users are rational and their objects are personal utility maximization, they may increase their utilities by misreporting, which may damage the social welfare. Thus well-designed auction mechanisms are needed to help service clouds extract users' real information and make decisions efficiently. When designing proper auction mechanisms, there are many challenges. First, the problem of job scheduling and pricing with the object of achieving optimal social welfare is NP-hard. The decisions of service providers consist of which jobs to execute, when to execute, on which instances to execute and the corresponding payment charged to users. Second, the mechanism should enforce selfish users to reveal their true valuations. Third, soft deadline constraints and flexible degree of parallelism increase the difficulty of making decisions and guaranteeing truthfulness. Service providers need to select proper degree of parallelism and completion time, which will affect the social welfare seriously. To address these challenges, we first propose a truthful randomized scheduling mechanism which can approximately schedule and price pleasingly parallel jobs in service clouds.
However, like most of existing truthful mechanisms, our randomized scheduling mechanism assumes that end users do not collude with each other. Thus it is vulnerable to collusion attack. There are many cases where collusion has significant effects [3] , such as collusion in the famous Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (i.e., VCG) mechanism [4] - [6] . With the development of Internet and cryptography, collusion among users becomes easier and easier. In the process of scheduling parallel jobs in service clouds mentioned above, there may exist coalition of users who have incentives to collude by adopting untruthful bidding to maximize their total utility. Since collusion is a private action among users and it is hard to be revealed, it is especially important to design mechanisms which can resist collusion by themselves. Thus we further propose a collusion-resistant mechanism to resist the collusion among users while scheduling and charging users.
More specifically, our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We design two new auction mechanisms to solve the optimal job scheduling and pricing problem in service clouds, with the unique features of job-oriented users, pleasingly parallel jobs and soft deadline constraints.
• Under the assumption that no collusion exists among users, we first propose a randomized scheduling mechanism. The proposed mechanism is truthful in expectation and thus can guarantee that users will bid truthfully. Through theoretical analysis, we show that this mechanism achieves an expected social welfare approximation ratio α = 1 + C max C min −β (1 + ε), where ε > 0.
• While focusing on scheduling and pricing jobs, we take the collusion into consideration and further propose a collusion-resistant mechanism which is (t, P)-truthful.
It means with probability P or higher, a coalition of size t or fewer has no incentive to collude. Theoretical analysis shows that this mechanism achieves good performance in collusion resistance.
• Both of these two mechanisms are computationally efficient and individually rational, thus they have polynomial-time complexity and can make the utilities of all users non-negative. They can also schedule jobs while guaranteeing the non-preemption of tasks (i.e., an ongoing task cannot be interrupted before its completion). Through extensive simulations based on both synthetic and real data, we validate the effectiveness of our mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces the related work and Section III presents the system model and problem formulation of our optimal pleasingly parallel job scheduling problem. We propose our randomized scheduling mechanism and collusion-resistant mechanism in Sections IV and V, respectively. In Section VI we verify their performance through simulations. Finally, we state concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Auction models have been widely used in a wide range of fields. For example, Li et al. [7] use the combinatorial auction model to tackle the spectrum trading for energyharvesting-enabled internet of things in harsh environments. In [8] , Zhao et al. also focus on the spectrum auction, they propose a multi-slot spectrum mechanism with deep neural network algorithm in heterogeneous networks. Han et al. [9] propose an auction-based incentive mechanism to protect LBS users' privacy. In [10] , Xu et al. propose a reverse auction as an incentive mechanism for social mobile crowdsensing architecture, which improves both quantity and quality. Zhong et al. [11] propose a distributed auction mechanism for multi-energy scheduling of an energy hub that serves numbers of building energy users. However, these works are not for cloud environments.
For the resource allocation and pricing in cloud computing environments, auction mechanism is also a popular and effective tool for maximizing social welfare. Besides the classic VCG mechanism, [12] and [13] propose truthful approximate mechanisms which use greedy technology for cloud resource allocation. In [14] , Zhang et al. propose a randomized truthful mechanism which utilizes decomposition technique to address dynamic resource provisioning in clouds. Zhang et al. [15] propose an efficient randomized auction mechanism for dynamic VM provisioning in geo-distributed cloud data centers. However, most of auction mechanisms in clouds concentrate on the trading of VMs rather than services. They need users to specify their resource demands. Besides, no deadline constraint is considered in these auctions. Thus, they are not suitable for scheduling parallel jobs in service clouds.
Using mechanism design to solve the job scheduling problems has also been investigated in previous studies. Christodoulou et al. [16] consider the mechanism design version of fractional scheduling on unrelated machines. Also, Chen et al. [17] design a copula-based generic randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling on two unrelated machines. The goals of these works are all makespan minimization and neither of them considers the pricing problem of jobs. Varakantham et al. [18] study the strategic variant of resource constrained project scheduling problems. They provide truthful mechanisms in which agents report their durations and costs of tasks as bids. Jain et al. propose a truthful mechanism for value-based scheduling problem in cloud computing in [19] . Users in this mechanism are required to specify their resource demands. Their model only considers one type of instances and can not guarantee the non-preemption of the pleasingly parallel jobs. These settings limit its feasibility for our problem.
Based on these discussions, one of our main contributions lies in that we propose a randomized scheduling mechanism for optimally scheduling and pricing pleasingly parallel jobs in service clouds. In this mechanism, job scheduling and pricing schemes are determined effectively while achieving approximately optimal social welfare. Unfortunately, all the mechanisms mentioned above assume that there is no collusion existing among users, including our mechanism.
There are also recent works which try to solve the collusion problem. References [20] and [21] propose group strategyproof mechanisms, in which no coalition of users can collude by bidding untruthfully so that some members of the coalition strictly benefit without causing other members to be strictly worse off. However, exchanging side-payments between users is not allowed in this kind of mechanisms, which is unsuitable in practice. References [22] and [23] propose mechanisms with verification. In their works, verification steps can discover the untruthful bidding and punish the lying users. However, since we cannot observe the true valuations of users, verification cannot be used in our problem. Reference [12] proposes a collusion-resistant mechanism for resource pricing problem in clouds and Wang et al. [24] address the collusion problem in spectrum auction. However, only one type of instances is sold and each user only needs one unit in the above two mechanisms. In addition, they focus on trading VMs rather than services and no deadline constraint is considered in the mechanisms. To address the collusion problem among users, we further propose a collusion-resistant mechanism which can resist the collusion of user coalitions.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. FUNDAMENTAL NOTATIONS
Considering that the whole time axis is infinite and the users arrive constantly, we propose that scheduling and pricing schemes are determined through round by round auctions with regular time intervals, which means the time intervals are of the same duration. At the start of each interval, the service cloud processes all the job requests arrived so far. These jobs will either be completed in the next interval, or be rejected. The rejected jobs need to be re-submitted.
We consider a service cloud which hosts a resource pool of m instance types, denoted by M = {1, 2, . . . , m}. The number of units of instance j is r j . In each interval, the time axis is divided into T discrete slots, denoted by T = {1, 2, . . . , T }. There are total n users whose requests will be processed in an interval, denoted by U = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We assume that each user has a pleasingly parallel job to execute and jobs are scheduled according to time slots. In this paper, ''user i's job'' and ''job i'' are interchangeable since each user has only one job request. The runtime of a job on different instance types is varied, depending on the performance of the instances. We use l i,j to denote the estimated runtime of job i (user i's job) on instance j, i.e., the number of time slots needed to complete job i on one unit of instance j. This information can be obtained via historical data collected from previous execution records. Determining estimates of jobs' runtime is a complex problem that has been extensively researched ( [25] ) and falls beyond the scope of this paper.
As Fig. 2 shows, different scheduling schemes of a job result in different completion time (i.e., the completion time of the last task), and further correspond to different valuations of the user. Thus the service cloud needs to determine the scheduling schemes properly. Considering the practical situations of job execution, we use threshold k i to limit the degree of parallelism, i.e., the maximum number of tasks that job i can be divided into. 
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We formulate the optimal pleasingly parallel job scheduling and pricing problem in service clouds. Let y e i,j (t) represent the number of units of instance j assigned to job i with completion time e at time slot t.
In this work, the goal of the problem is maximizing the social welfare, which is the sum of all users' utilities i∈U ( e∈T v e i x e i − p i ) and the revenue of service cloud i∈U p i . Under the assumption of b i = v i (which will be proved later), the objective function is: Since a job should only be completed once, a user can win at most one bid even if it submits multiple bids, leading to the constraint:
The number of units of each instance type is finite, which translates to the capacity constraint of service cloud:
In practice, the degree of parallelism of a job is limited by a threshold, leading to the constraint:
Combining the goal with the constraints, we now describe our problem in more formal and mathematical terms:
Here the scheduling is flexible, since the number of units of instances y e i,j (t) allocated to job i can be different at different time slots. Constraint (1) indicates the relation between x e i and y e i,j (t). Constraint (5) means a unit of instance can only run one job per time slot for guaranteeing the non-preemption of tasks. Constraint (6) means partial completion of a job is not allowed, since partial completion for a job is generally meaningless. To achieve non-preemption, a unit of instance can only complete an integer number of tasks in a time slot and the excess performance will be ignored. = 15 for Jim), in order to maximize the objective function and obey the constraints, the service cloud will allocate the instance to Tom at time slot 1, to Jim at time slot 2 and to Bob at time slot 3. The social welfare is 25 + 7 + 4 = 36, which is the largest in this scenario.
C. DESIRED PROPERTIES
As the above example shows, by solving (IP) we can get the optimal scheduling scheme, according to which the cloud can schedule the three jobs on its instances and achieve maximum social welfare. However, finding the exact solution to (IP) is NP-hard. Besides, to satisfy the assumption of b i = v i , the truthful bidding of users should be guaranteed. Thus, when designing mechanisms for optimally scheduling and pricing pleasingly parallel jobs, we seek to achieve the following properties.
• Approximately optimal social welfare: Since finding the optimal solution is difficult, the mechanisms should calculate a feasible solution and approximately maximize the social welfare.
• Truthfulness (in expectation): For each user, reporting its true valuations always maximizes its (expected) utility, regardless of the bids reported by other users.
• Computational efficiency: Polynomial-time mechanisms are needed to run efficiently in practice.
• Individual rationality: The utility of each user is non-negative in the auction, which means the payment a user should pay will not exceed its valuation. This property guarantees the voluntary participation of users.
• (t, P)-Truthful): A mechanism is (t, P)-truthful if it can produce an outcome such that with probability P or higher, no coalition of users with size t or fewer can increase their total utility by untruthful bidding. In the following sections, we aim to design truthful auction mechanisms by considering two different scenarios-with and without collusion respectively.
IV. A RANDOMIZED SCHEDULING MECHANISM
We first consider the scenario without collusion, where users will not collude together to misreport. We have proposed a preliminary mechanism in our previous work [26] . Here we describe the randomized scheduling mechanism in details, which guarantees truthfulness, computational efficiency, individual rationality and achieves an approximation ratio α.
As shown in Algorithm. 1, our randomized scheduling mechanism consists of a job scheduling algorithm and a pricing algorithm. Next we will introduce the details.
A. A SCHEDULING ALGORITHM 1) THE OPTIMAL FRACTIONAL SOLUTION
Since finding the exact solution for (IP) is NP-hard, we consider its corresponding linear programming (LP) by maintaining the objective function and relaxing the integer constraints (5) and (6) respectively to:
Algorithm 1 A Randomized Scheduling Mechanism Input: The user set, bids, runtime and threshold. Output: The feasible scheduling and payment schemes.
1: Scheduling algorithm.
-Formulate the optimal parallel job scheduling and pricing problem in service clouds as an integer programming (IP), and relax it to a linear programming (LP). -Solve the linear programming (LP) and get the optimal fractional solution x * . This fractional solution corresponds to optimal social welfare but is actually an infeasible scheme. -Decompose the optimal fractional solution x * into a series of feasible integer solutions through a coloring decomposition algorithm. -Select one feasible integer solution randomly and schedule jobs on the instances according to it.
2: Pricing algorithm.
-Calculate the payments charged to users, based on the marginal harm caused by the participation of a user to other users.
Considering a fractional x e i and corresponding y e i , a simple method to fully complete job i is to multiply y e i by 1/x e i . This process makes x e i = 1, which means job i is fully completed at time e. However, this process may violate the threshold k i of job i. Thus, we modify constraint (4) to:
By dealing with (LP) we can get optimal fractional scheduling scheme in polynomial time, denoted by x * (as well as corresponding y). The corresponding optimal social welfare is OPT * . However, the fractional x * and y are infeasible in practice. Thus we propose a coloring-based decomposition algorithm to determine feasible integer schemes and achieve an approximately optimal social welfare.
2) A COLORING-BASED DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
Our decomposition algorithm is based on the idea of coloring [27] . As Algorithm 2 shows, the decomposition algorithm consists of two main steps, which are constructing a color set I and dividing the elements in I into a series of groups corresponding to feasible solutions respectively.
Let a e i denote a full allocation that satisfies j,t a e i,j (t) · 1 l i,j = 1, meaning if we schedule job i according to a e i , job i can be fully completed at time slot e. Now we introduce the two steps of our decomposition algorithm in details.
Step Finally, we construct a color set I. Assume that
N is a parameter which can be set by the service cloud. Let:
For each user i, we add N · x e i copies of a e i into I. The time complexity of this process is O(nN ).
Step II (Coloring Allocation): We divide the allocations in I into several independent groups, with the following rules: 1) No two allocations in the same group belong to the same job. 2) No two allocations in the same group conflict with time and the capacity constraint of service provider. Clearly, an independent group defines a feasible scheduling scheme and the allocations in this group are colored with an identical color. The number of colors used by the decomposition algorithm can be bounded as follows. 
Theorem 1: The number of colors used by the coloringbased decomposition algorithm is at most COL, where
Then, we consider reason 2). We use c j (t) = a∈c a e i,j (t) to denote the number of units of instance j colored by c at time slot t. Since coloring a e i with color c violates the capacity constraint of the service cloud, there must be a time slot t at which c j (t) + a e i,j (t) > r j . From equation
we know that the number of units of instance j that c can color is:
Based on equations (3), (9) and (10), the total number of units of instance j at time slot t in set I is at most:
Thus, to guarantee that the process of coloring allocation does not violate service cloud's capacity constraint, the number of colors is at most:
In summary, the number of colors used by the coloring-based decomposition algorithm is at most: COL = N · (1 + For each color c, we need to check every allocation in I to determine which allocations can be colored, so the time complexity of using one color is O(nN ). When N is large, the number of colors used by the decomposition algorithm is bounded by O(N ). So the time complexity of coloring allocation is O(nN 2 ) .
B. A PRICING ALGORITHM
For enforcing selfish users to bid truthfully, we design a pricing algorithm to calculate the payments charged to users. We propose that each user i should pay its externality, denoted by:
which is the marginal harm caused by the participation of user i to other users. OPT U \i is the optimal fractional social welfare without i's participation, by solving (IP). The right part means the optimal social welfare caused by x * minus the corresponding valuation of user i.
However, because of the randomness, the use of this pricing algorithm may violate the requirement of individual rationality in some cases. This is because a user may receive nothing but pay a positive payment, which makes its utility negative. To maintain individual rationality, for the users whose jobs are not completed in the final scheduling scheme, we set their payments to 0:
Combining the scheduling algorithm with the pricing algorithm, our randomized scheduling mechanism can guarantee truthfulness. Considering the example in Fig. 3 , when users bid truthfully, based on our randomized scheduling mechanism, the service cloud will allocate the instance to Tom at time slot 1, to Jim at time slot 2 and to Bob at time slot 3. The payment of Tom is p T = 15 + 6 − 7 − 4 = 10 and the payment of Jim is p J = 25 + 6 − 25 − 4 = 2. So the utilities of Tom and Jim are u T = 15 and u J = 5 respectively.
C. THE PROPERTIES OF THE RANDOMIZED SCHEDULING MECHANISM 1) THE APPROXIMATION RATIO
First we prove the efficiency of our mechanism by theoretical analysis.
Theorem 2: The proposed randomized scheduling mechanism can achieve an expected social welfare approximation ratio α in polynomial-time, where
Proof: Recall that OPT * is the optimal social welfare obtained by (LP). The expected social welfare in set I is: 
In summary, the mechanism is expected α-approximation. When k is substantially smaller than C min , the approximation ratio will approach to 2. Considering the whole process of job scheduling and pricing, the time complexity of the randomized scheduling mechanism is polynomial.
2) THE TRUTHFULNESS
Then we show that our mechanism can guarantee the truthful bidding of users.
Theorem 3: The proposed randomized scheduling mechanism is truthful in expectation.
Proof: Here we assume that the number of colors used by Algorithm 2 is COL. By selecting a feasible scheduling scheme randomly and scheduling jobs according to it, from equation (13), the expected social welfare is:
which implies the valuations of user i are scaled down by α. Similarly, the expected payment charged to user i is its externality scaled down by α.
Assuming that if user i bids truthfully, its job will be completed at time slot e and the payment it should pay is i . If user i bids untruthfully (i.e. b i = v i ), its job will be completed at time slot f and the payment is i . According to the pricing algorithm, the payments charged to user i are respectively:
OPT e
U \i is the optimal social welfare of all users other than i when i's job is completed at time slot e, and OPT f U \i is the social welfare when i's job is completed at time slot f . Then the difference of expected utility of user i between truthful and untruthful bidding is:
Since untruthful bidding results in the decrease of utility, users will not try to misreport. Thus our randomized scheduling mechanism is truthful in expectation.
3) THE INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
Next we analyze the individual rationality as follows.
Theorem 4: The proposed randomized scheduling mechanism is individually rational.
Proof: If user i's job is fully completed at time slot e, then its utility is
It is noted that OPT U \i must be less than OPT U . This is because OPT U \i is only a feasible solution where user i fails the auction and thus must be no less than the optimal solution OPT U . Thus the utility is no less than 0. From the pricing algorithm, we know that if user i's job is not fully completed, its payment p i = 0 and its utility u i = 0.
In summary, the utility of each user is non-negative in the auction. Therefore, the mechanism is individually rational.
V. A COLLUSION-RESISTANT MECHANISM
In this section, we consider the scenario with collusion. To avoid the possible collusion, we further propose a collusion-resistant mechanism which is (t, P)-truthful for optimally scheduling and pricing pleasingly parallel jobs. This mechanism can be proved to guarantee that with probability P or higher, a coalition of size t or fewer has no incentive to collude, while simultaneously ensuring computational efficiency and individual rationality.
A. AN EXAMPLE OF COLLUSION
We first consider an example to show that when using our randomized scheduling mechanism, users may form coalitions and exchange side-payments to increase their total utility. In Fig. 3 , if Tom and Jim form a coalition, they will try to increase their total utility by untruthful bidding. For this purpose, Jim may under-bid 13 at time slot 1 (as shown in the box) and this under-bidding will not affect the scheduling result. The payment of Tom reduces to p T = 13 + 6 − 7 − 4 = 8, so its utility increases to u T = 25 − 8 = 17. The payment and utility of Jim keep constant. The total utility of this coalition increases from 20 to 22. Obviously, Tom will give Jim a side-payment between 0 and 2 in order to induce it to join the coalition. This simple example clearly demonstrates that a coalition of users may have incentives to collude, in order to increase their total utility. This behavior will influence the normal market. Therefore, we need to design a mechanism to resist collusion.
B. THE DETAILS OF OUR COLLUSION-RESISTANT MECHANISM
To design a collusion-resistant mechanism, we consider to use the consensus estimate technique [28] which can estimate the lower bound of a value. This lower bound will not change when the value varies in a specific range, which we can utilize to resist the influence of collusion. The key of our mechanism lies in using random sampling to increase randomness and using consensus estimate technique to guarantee the non-manipulation by a coalition. The collusion-resistant mechanism offers each user a ''take it or leave it'' price. Only the users whose bids are higher than these prices can get the services they need. These prices are the final payments charged to users.
To approximately calculate the number of winners (i.e., the users whose jobs can be completed), we handle the multiple instance types as like there is only ''one'' type. A simple method is using an instance weight w, which is related to the performance of the instances. For simplicity, we assume that w is increasing. In this way we can normalize other instances to the first one. Then we calculate the total number of units of available instances C and the number of units of instances d i needed by job i, both of which are normalized to the first instance. Here we set the runtime of job i on the first instance as d i . So the approximate number of winners is set to q = · z e for each bid, where z e reflects the change of the valuations with completion time. Table 2 summaries the extra notations used in the collusion-resistant mechanism. Now we introduce the main steps of the collusion-resistant mechanism, as shown in Algorithm 3. The first step is calculating the related values, including the number of winners q and the criterion value s. The second step is sampling from the bids and selecting the highest criterion value as o. The third step is using a consensus estimation function to estimate the number of bids whose criterion values are larger than o, denoted by n o . n o changes very little when some bids are changed. The fourth step is determining the scheduling and payment schemes. If n o ≤ q, we will let all the bids whose criterion values are larger than o be winning bids. Otherwise, we will select winning bids from them with probability
However, if the final number of winning bids after selecting with probability q 2n o is larger than q, we will use the randomized scheduling mechanism mentioned in Section 4 to determine the winners.
In Algorithm 3, the scheduling scheme and the payment scheme are the final solution to the problem, according to which the service cloud can schedule jobs on its instances and charge users correspondingly. Selecting the highest criterion value as o in the sample set is a method to estimate the q th highest criterion value of all bids. # o (s) {2 i+h :i∈Z} is the consensus estimation function used in our mechanism, where 
C. THE PROPERTIES OF THE COLLUSION-RESISTANT MECHANISM 1) THE TRUTHFULNESS
Now we prove that the collusion-resistant mechanism is (t, P)-truthful, i.e., with probability P or higher, a collusion coalition of size t or fewer has no incentive to collude.
Theorem 5: The proposed collusion-resistant mechanism is t-truthful with probability P = 1 − O( Select a bid randomly.
3:
if b e i > p e i then 4: for j = 1 : m do 5: for t = e : 1 do
Allocate instances in a greedy manner. The number of instances allocated to users are integers.
7:
end for 8: end for 9: end if 10: end while 11: if more than one bids of user i are selected then 12: Calculate the reported utility u e i = b e i − p e i .
13:
Select the bid whose u e i is largest as the winning bid of user i, and let payment p i = p e i .
14: end if
Proof: In our mechanism, if there are t users colluding, then there are total t = tT bids which may change. There are three cases where collusion may influence our mechanism:
1) The bid with the highest criterion value o in the sample set belongs to the coalition and n o ≤ q. In this case the collusive users can manipulate the auction directly by controlling o. 2) n o is not t-consensus [28] and n o > q. It means if there are t users lying about their bids, n o will change, which will lead to the changes in scheduling results. So the collusive users can manipulate the auction by influencing n o , i.e., by bidding untruthfully. 3) After selecting winning bids with probability q 2n o , the final number of winning bids is larger than q. It means that the algorithm will run the randomized scheduling mechanism, which is vulnerable to collusion. First we analyze the probability of the occurrence of these three cases in details. This probability is also the probability that our mechanism may be influenced by collusion.
In case 1), to manipulate o, at least one bid that belongs to the coalition has to be selected in the sample set. Since the sample probability is 1 q , for a coalition of size t, the probability that bids in the coalition are selected to sample set is 
Based on a series of mathematical calculations [29] , we can get that the probability that n o is not t-consensus is:
In case 3), after selecting bids with probability q 2n o , the expected number of winning bids is
According to Chernoff Bound which is often used in probability theory, the probability of running the randomized scheduling mechanism is
In summary, since the probabilities of the three cases when collusion may influence our mechanism are tT q , ( tT q ) and o( tT q ) respectively, the probability that our mechanism will not be influenced by collusion is P = 1 − O( tT q ). Then we prove that if the three cases where collusion may influence our mechanism mentioned above do not occur, our mechanism will be truthful.
Since the three cases mentioned above do not occur, untruthful bidding of a user will not influence the sampled o and the consensus estimate value n o . The randomized scheduling mechanism will not be used. So the payment p charged to users will not be influenced. Now we analyze all the possible cases.
Case 1: When user i bids truthfully, no bid of user i wins the competition, which means b e i = v e i < p e i . In this case user i loses the competition (i.e., its job cannot be completed) and thus its utility is u i = 0. Now we analyze all the untruthful cases.
• If p e i > v e i > b e i , user i will still lose the competition and its utility is u i = 0, which will not change.
• If p e i > b e i > v e i , user i will still lose the competition and its utility is u i = 0, which will not change.
• If b e i > p e i > v e i , user i will win the competition and its utility is u i = v e i − p e i < 0, which will decrease. • For the lost bids, if user i bids untruthfully, its utility will be less than or equal to 0 (see Case 1). Since if more than one bid of user i wins the competition, the mechanism will select the one whose reported utility (i.e., b e i − p e i ) is largest, then untruthful bidding of the lost bids will not increase users' utility. i . In this case user i wins the competition and its utility u i is the largest of the reported utility of all winning bids, which is apparently larger than 0. Now we analyze all the untruthful cases.
• For the winning bids, since if more than one bid of user i wins the competition, the mechanism will select the one whose reported utility is largest, then apparently bidding truthfully will get the largest utility.
• For the lost bids, as shown in Case 2, untruthful bidding will not increase user's utility. As analyzed above, untruthful bidding will not increase users' utility. Thus, when the three cases where collusion may influence our mechanism do not occur, the proposed mechanism is truthful.
In summary, the collusion-resistant mechanism in Algorithm 3 is t-truthful with probability P = 1 − O( tT q ).
2) THE INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
Here we analyze the individual rationality as follows.
Theorem 6: The proposed collusion-resistant mechanism is individually rational.
Proof: Since only the users whose valuations are larger than corresponding payments can get the services, the utility of each users is non-negative. Therefore, the mechanism is individually rational.
In the worst cases, the time complexity of the collusion-resistant mechanism equals the time complexity of the randomized scheduling mechanism in Algorithm 1, which is polynomial. However, the probability of these worst cases is just O(tT /q). In most cases, the time complexity of the mechanism equals the time complexity of Algorithm 4. In Algorithm 4, the time of determining the scheduling of one bid is O(mT ). Since there are total O(nT ) bids, the time complexity of Algorithm 3 is O(nmT 2 ).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION A. SIMULATION SETUP
To evaluate the performance of our mechanisms, we use both synthetic data and real Google cluster-usage data. 4 Since the goal of solving our problem is to achieve optimal social 4 Google cluster data, https://github.com/google/cluster-data/ welfare, we focus on evaluating our mechanism in terms of social welfare. We design simulations for two main purposes, which are verifying the performance of the randomized scheduling mechanism and the performance of the collusion-resistant mechanism respectively. The parameters can be set according to actual situations. In this section, we assume that there is a service cloud with m = 4 types of instances, and the time axis of a round auction is divided into T = 6 time slots. The bids of users are proportional to the runtime of jobs, and the valuation preferences of users on their job executions are divergent. The bids of a user are monotonically non-decreasing with completion time e. The detailed parameter settings of all the experiments are shown in Table 3 . In the synthetic data, the threshold k i is drawn from [5, 30] . The runtime l of a job on different instance types is inversely proportional to the performance of instances. The runtime of all jobs follows different distributions. The Google cluster-usage data captures rich information on users' jobs, including runtime l and threshold k i . The related data and results are put on a website [30] .
B. SIMULATIONS OF THE RANDOMIZED SCHEDULING MECHANISM
For the randomized scheduling mechanism, we implement the corresponding fractional VCG mechanism for comparison. We compare the result obtained by our mechanism with the optimal fractional result calculated by VCG mechanism and the theoretical result which equals the optimal fractional result divided by α. It should be pointed out that the optimal fractional result is infeasible in practice and the theoretical result is only a theoretical value. Thus these two results only work as benchmarks for comparison. In EXP3, we further compare our randomized mechanism with two other mechanisms. The parameter N which is used in the coloring-based decomposition algorithm is related to the theoretical approximation ratio and the runtime of the mechanism. These two factors should be considered together when using this mechanism. In the simulations of this paper, N is set to 5000. Besides, considering the randomized nature, for each experiment we randomly select 100 integer scheduling schemes rather than only one to compute the average result. The first three simulations use synthetic data and the latter two simulations use Google data.
1) EXP1: REPEATING EXPERIMENT OF A FIXED SCENARIO
In this group of simulations, we choose a fixed scenario setting, repeat it for 50 times and record the results. The detailed parameter settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP1''.
In Fig. 4 , the green curve is the optimal fractional social welfare calculated by fractional VCG mechanism and it is the largest. The red curve is the theoretical results calculated by α. These two curves are horizontal, which means when the scenario is fixed, both the optimal fractional result and the theoretical results remain unchanged. The blue point is the actual social welfare obtained from our randomized scheduling mechanism and it is fluctuant above the red curve, which means the actual results are uncertain and they are always better than theoretical results. The fluctuation is due to the fact that when constructing the mechanism, several random factors are added into it, including the construction of color set and the random selection of the final scheduling scheme. From this group of simulations we can see that the worst (best) actual result is about 42.1% (58.2%) of the optimal social welfare, and more than 50% actual results have an approximation ratio better than 2. These simulations show that our mechanism can achieve an approximately optimal social welfare.
2) EXP2: INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT RUNTIME DISTRIBUTIONS
We investigate the generated social welfare with different runtime distributions (normal, uniform and constant respectively). The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP2.1'', ''EXP2.2'' and ''EXP2.3''. ''normal(µ, σ )'' means the runtime is drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ . ''uniform(l, h)'' means the runtime is drawn from a uniform distribution bounded by l and h. And ''constant ζ '' means the runtime is always ζ . The number of users n varies from 60 to 150, adding 10 to each experiment.
From Fig. 5 , we can see that the three figures corresponding to three different runtime distributions are much similar, which means the performance of our mechanism does not change significantly under different runtime distributions. This result enables our mechanism to be more widely used.
3) EXP3: COMPARISON WITH OTHER MECHANISMS
We first compare our randomized scheduling mechanism with a greedy mechanism (Greedy1) [12] . Greedy algorithm is a classical and widely-used algorithm which can obtain a suboptimal solution with low computational complexity. The greedy mechanism first sorts all the bids in descending order according to the value per unit resource. Then it selects winners iteratively until all the resources are assigned. The payment of each winner is its critical value, which is the smallest value such that user i will win the auction if it bids higher than this value. However, if each user has multiple bids in the auction, the greedy mechanism loses truthfulness [31] . Thus users may misreport their bids and try to get higher utilities. To compare our truthful mechanism with greedy mechanism, we assume that a certain proportion of users will misreport their bids in greedy mechanism. Since our randomized scheduling mechanism is truthful, all the users will reveal their true valuations. We compare the social welfare of our randomized mechanism with the actual social welfare of greedy mechanism (i.e., we use the bids reported by users to run the mechanism and use their actual valuations to calculate FIGURE 5. Social welfare of our randomized scheduling mechanism compared with the optimal fractional result and theoretical result, with three runtime distributions. Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP3.1''. The proportion of misreported users varies from 20% to 80%, adding 2% to each experiment.
In Fig. 6a , the runtime of users is drawn from a normal distribution normal (20, 5) and in Fig. 6b , the runtime of users is drawn from a uniform distribution uniform (15, 25) . At first the social welfare of the greedy mechanism decreases with the increase of the proportion of the misreported users. This is because if more users misreport their bids, the mechanism will get more damage. However, when the number of misreported users is large enough, the social welfare of the greedy mechanism begins to increase. This is due to the fact that the increase (decrease) of most users' bids is equivalent to the decrease (increase) of a small number of users' bids. As for our randomized scheduling mechanism, since the users are truthful, the results of our mechanism will not be affected. In this group of simulations, we can see that our randomized mechanism outperforms the Greedy1 by 26.9% and 27.9% at most, when users misreport their bids.
We then compare our randomized scheduling mechanism with another simple truthful mechanism (Greedy2). In this mechanism, the service provider services the jobs in descending order of runtime (i.e., the size of the jobs). Then the mechanism calculates the payment of each user according to the payment rule of our randomized scheduling mechanism. In this way the utility of a user may be negative and thus it will not participate the auction. To avoid this situation, the mechanism only serves the users whose utility is nonnegative. Since the payment of a user is not affected by the bids of this user, the mechanism is truthful. The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP3.2''. The number of users n varies from 110 to 200, adding 10 to each experiment.
From Fig. 7 we can see that the simple greedy mechanism Greedy2 is very unsteady, since its goal of schedule is not social welfare maximization. Thus this mechanism can not solve our scheduling and pricing problem efficiently. This situation happens to many other scheduling algorithms. In this group of simulations, our randomized mechanism outperforms the Greedy2 by 45.3% on average and by 119.6% at most.
4) EXP4: COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL AND ACTUAL APPROXIMATION RATIOS
In this group of simulations, we compare the actual approximate ratio with theoretical approximate ratio α, using Google VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 7. Social welfare of our randomized scheduling mechanism compared with Greedy2, when the number of users is varying.
cluster-usage data. The detailed parameter settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP3''. The number of users n is 70, 90, 110, 130 and 150 respectively. As Fig. 8 illustrates, our randomized scheduling mechanism achieves an approximately optimal social welfare, much better than the theoretical approximation ratio α proved in Theorem 2. The actual approximation ratio is only 52.4% of the theoretical approximation ratio on average.
5) EXP5: PERFORMANCE OF VARYING THE NUMBER OF USERS
In these simulations, we study the performance of our mechanism when the number of users is varying, using Google cluster-usage data. The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP4''. We vary the number of users n from 60 to 300, adding 10 to each experiment. Fig. 9 shows the social welfare of the service cloud. As Fig. 9 shows, we can see that as the number of users increases, the social welfare (green curves) of the fractional VCG mechanism increase almost linearly at first. This is because when the resources are adequate, as the number of users increases, the service cloud will satisfy more users' service requests, which results in the increase of the social welfare and revenue. The actual results (blue points) and the theoretical results (red curves) are related to the approximation ratios, which are different in different scenario settings. However, when the number of users is large enough, the increase of the social welfare becomes slight, which is FIGURE 9. Social welfare of our randomized scheduling mechanism compared with the optimal fractional result and theoretical result, when the number of users is varying.
due to the limit of the cloud resources. Although more users submit service requests to the cloud, the number of users the cloud can serve is almost fixed, which limits the increase of the social welfare. These simulations show that under practice data, our randomized mechanism can approximately maximize the social welfare.
C. SIMULATIONS OF THE COLLUSION-RESISTANT MECHANISM
For the collusion-resistant mechanism (''C-R'' in the figures), we first verify its performance in terms of social welfare. Then we verify its collusion resistance in terms of coalition utility, which is the total utility of all the users in the coalition. Again, we repeat 100 times of each experiment to compute the average result. The first simulation uses synthetic data and the latter three simulations use Google data.
1) EXP6: INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT RUNTIME DISTRIBUTIONS
We investigate the generated social welfare with different runtime distributions (normal, uniform and constant respectively). The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP6.1'', ''EXP6.2'' and ''EXP6.3''. The number of users n varies from 60 to 150, adding 10 to each experiment. From Fig. 10 , we can see that just like EXP2, the three lines are much similar, which means the performance of our mechanism does not change significantly under different runtime distributions. This result can enable our mechanism to be more widely used.
2) EXP7: PERFORMANCE OF VARYING THE NUMBER OF USERS
In this simulation, we study the performance of our mechanism when the number of users is varying, using Google cluster-usage data. The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP7''. We vary the number of users n from 60 to 250, adding 10 to each experiment. FIGURE 11. Social welfare and revenue of our collusion-resistant mechanism, when the number of users is varying. Fig. 11 shows the social welfare (red curve) and the revenue (blue curve) of the service cloud. As Fig. 11 shows, we can see that similar to EXP4, as the number of users increases, the social welfare and the revenue increase almost linearly at first. However, when the number of users is large enough, the increase of the social welfare and revenue becomes slight.
3) EXP8: SPECIFIC PATTERNS VERIFICATION OF COLLUSION RESISTANCE
In this group of simulations, we identify a number of collusive patterns that are effective in the randomized scheduling mechanism and then examine their effects in our collusion-resistant mechanism through calculating the changes of the coalition utility between non-collusion and collusion scenarios, using Google data. The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP8''. We fix the user and resource settings and consider t = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 respectively to focus on collusion of small coalitions. Fig. 12 shows the changes of the coalition utility for both our collusion-resistant mechanism and randomized scheduling mechanism. We can see that different from the randomized scheduling mechanism, in collusion-resistant mechanism the changes of the coalition utility between non-collusion and collusion are negative, which means collusion between users in the coalition leads to no gain but loss in coalition utility. Thus users have no incentive to collusion. These experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our mechanism in collusion resistance.
4) EXP9: RANDOMIZED PATTERNS VERIFICATION OF COLLUSION RESISTANCE
Since the actual behaviors of collusion are very complex and are hard to reveal, in this group of simulations, we select some possible collusive patterns randomly and then examine their effects in our collusion-resistant mechanism, using Google cluster-usage data. The detailed settings are shown in Table 3 , indicated by ''EXP9''. When the number of users n equals 50, we select 10, 20 and 30 users randomly as the coalition respectively. Then we run our mechanism under the following 4 simple cases and calculate the changes of the coalition utility between non-collusion and collusion scenarios. Note that the following 4 cases are just simple examples of collusion and different behaviors of collusion may result in different influences to coalition utility. From Fig. 13 we can see that for n = 50, when the size of the coalition is less than 20, the changes of the coalition utility between non-collusion and collusion are negative. It means our mechanism can resist collusion when the size of the coalition is less than 20. However, when the size of coalition is large, the probability of resisting collusion becomes small. In this situation collusion may increase the coalition utility, such as the Case 2 in the figure. Similar results are shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 . For n = 100 our mechanism can resist collusion when the size of the coalition is less than 50 and for n = 150 our mechanism can resist collusion when it is less than 70. In summary, our collusion-resistant mechanism can resist the collusion of about 40% users. These experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our mechanism in collusion resistance.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper focuses on the optimal job scheduling and pricing problem in service clouds, with unique features of job-oriented users, pleasingly parallel jobs and soft deadline constraints. Since the commonly used fixed-price models are unsuitable for service clouds, we design novel auction mechanisms for service providers to schedule and price jobs, while achieving maximum social welfare. The first randomized scheduling mechanism can achieve α-approximation to the social welfare and truthfulness in expectation. Considering the shortage that this mechanism cannot resist collusion among users, we further propose a collusion-resistant mechanism which is (t, P)-truthful. Both of these two mechanisms are computationally efficient, individually rational and can schedule jobs in a way without preemption.
The theoretical analysis and the simulations based on synthetic data and real-world job traces validate the effectiveness of our mechanism.
We can see that the social welfare gained by our current collusion-resistant mechanism is lower than the randomized scheduling mechanism. This is mainly due to the fact that randomness is added into this mechanism to resist collusion. We consider such losses as the tradeoff for achieving collusion resistance. In the future, we plan to design more efficient collusion-resistant mechanisms to achieve larger social welfare. What's more, since the cost of setting up, maintaining and operating data centers is generally high, service providers may reduce their costs and risk by purchasing on-demand instances (pay per unit instance per unit time) from IaaS clouds such as Amazon. Thus we consider to design truthful mechanism for purchasing instances as well as scheduling and pricing jobs.
